Android security tags, read closely by Lightrion

CVE-2024-43766 AI-generated analysis

platform/packages/modules/Bluetooth, system/stack (ACL/BTM/SMP/L2CAP LE security)

AI-generated: written from the bulletin and the fixing diffs by claude-fable-5-1, then checked against the code by claude-opus-5-5 (6 corrections). Verify against the commit before relying on it.

Makes the Bluetooth stack start LE link encryption as soon as an ACL connection to an already-bonded LE device is established (in StackAclBtmAcl::btm_establish_continue). Follow-up commits suppress spurious SMP failure handling, fix the order of the L2CAP link-state update and save the peer CSRK with the correct security level.

Root cause

In system/stack/acl/btm_acl.cc, StackAclBtmAcl::btm_establish_continue only did BR/EDR-specific work after connection (packet types, link policy) and did nothing for the LE transport. When an LE ACL came up to a peer with a security record and a known LE link key, the stack did not start link encryption itself. Encryption depended on later security requests, such as the L2CAP LE security check in btm_ble.cc that sets BTM_BLE_SEC_ENCRYPT or returns L2CAP_LE_RESULT_INSUFFICIENT_ENCRYP. The commit message states that the LE link must be encrypted immediately on connection if the devices are already bonded. The bulletin classifies the issue as information disclosure (ID), High severity.

How the fix works

Completeness

Behavior changes

Per major

Unknowns

Back to March 2026 · Findings